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Summary 
 
In its quest for more corporate restructuring and a single market for capital, the European 
Commission is pushing for Europe-wide takeover regulation. Previous attempts have failed largely 
due to differences in corporate governance arrangements across Member States. This article 
provides a framework for evaluating the effects of takeover regulation. We apply this framework to 
some specific proposals in the European debate and show that their impact often depends critically 
on the structure of ownership and control. In particular, two of the most discussed rules, the strict 
mandatory bid rule and the break-through rule, have no impact when ownership is dispersed. Also, 
the proposed break-trough rule would only affect firms with dual-class shares but not firms that use 
other control instruments. Moreover, the two rules would effectively counteract each other, the 
break-through rule promoting takeovers and the mandatory bid rule impeding them. Introducing a 
strict mandatory bid rule alone, as the Commission proposed, would slow down restructuring. We 
argue that while increased contestability of control is desirable hostile takeovers are a rather blunt 
instrument for achieving this. The market for corporate control is only one of many corporate 
governance mechanisms to be honed in order to promote corporate restructuring in Europe. 
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1.Introduction 
 
After decades of failed attempts and the stinging defeat in the European Parliament in 2001 the 
Commission remains committed to the idea of a pan-European takeover directive. The Commission 
argues that more takeovers will lead to more restructuring, and Europe badly needs more 
restructuring if it wants to catch up with, and overtake, the United States as set out in the Lisbon 
declaration. In 2002 a High Level Group of Company Law Experts appointed by the European 
Commission and under the leadership of the Dutch Law Professor Jaap Winter presented two 
reports; a first report on European takeover regulation and a final report on a modern regulatory 
framework for company law in the EU.  In the analysis of the Winter Group the core problem is the 
entrenched ownership and control structures in most Member States and the asymmetry of rules 
regulating takeovers. Consequently, the Group argues for more contestability of controlling owners 
and a level-playing field in takeover markets.  
 
To achieve contestability and a level-playing field the Group proposed a set of measures intended to 
limit defensive measures after a bid has been made for a company, most of them part of the failed 
draft directive from 2001. In particular, the proposal required that shareholders, not management, 
approve any defensive measures once a bid is announced, and that a bidder must pay all 
shareholders the same price (the mandatory bid rule). But the Group went further in proposing that 
differentiation of votes, one of the most common methods for separating ownership and control, 
should be voided in votes on takeover bids. Moreover, a bidder once he had achieved a qualified 
majority of equity could undo any statutory defenses, including any differentiation of votes (the so-
called break-through rule). The break-through rule was later dropped from the draft directive after 
intense criticism from several Member States and controlling owners affected by the rule, but 
together with the mandatory bid rule the break-through rule illustrates some fundamental principles 
in takeover regulation.  
 
Given their far-reaching nature and broad impact - the break-through rule, for example, alone would 
undermine the controlling position of the leading shareholder in one out of six listed companies 
with dual-class shares (Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2002) – it is remarkable that the proposals from the 
Winter Group and the Commission are essentially void of any economic analysis. Moreover, very 
little reference is made to the extensive empirical and theoretical literature on takeovers and 
corporate governance in economics. This article wants to provide the missing analysis. We provide 
a conceptual framework to analyze the interrelationship between the market for corporate control 
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and corporate governance. The framework also allows us to understand how the effects of specific 
pieces of regulation depend on the context, in particular on existing structures of ownership and 
control. Ultimately, we ask the question what type of takeover regulation and corporate governance 
reform do we need in Europe to achieve more restructuring.  
  
Takeover regulation determines the rules of the game before and after a bid for control over a firm 
has been placed. These rules influence the distribution of gains from takeovers between the bidding 
firm and the target firm, and between controlling and minority shareholders in the target firm. The 
more of the surplus that is allocated to the bidding firm, the stronger are the incentives to make a 
bid. And the more of the surplus the minority shareholders appropriate, the less incentives there are 
to hold controlling blocks. Any body of takeover regulations, such as the Commission’s draft 
directive or the UK City Code contain a substantial number of provisions, most of them generally 
accepted. In this paper we focus on three sets of measures where there is still controversy: specific 
defensive measures, mandatory bid rules, and break-through rules. They illustrate the basic 
economic principles of takeover regulation, and they are central to the debate on takeover regulation 
and mobility of corporate control in Europe.  
 
Our analysis shows that the effects of individual pieces of takeover regulation often depend 
critically on the ownership and control structure in the target firm. For example, neither the 
mandatory bid rule nor the break-through rule have any impact when a firm’s shares are widely 
dispersed. More importantly, the specific break-through rule proposed by the Winter Group only 
affects dual class shares and not other control instruments. Moreover, and less well understood, 
when there is a controlling minority shareholder, the mandatory bid rule makes it more costly to 
take over a firm and the break-through rule makes it cheaper. In other words, the two rules have 
opposite effects: one encourages takeover activity and the other discourages such activity. 
  
The Commission’s draft directive, without the break-through rule but with a strict mandatory bid 
rule, further entrenches existing control structures and reduces contestability, contrary to its 
intentions. We show that a strict mandatory bid rule does eliminate some value reducing takeover 
bids, but at the cost of also getting rid of some value-increasing bids. In particular, the mandatory 
bid rule effectively shuts down the trade in controlling blocks, the dominant form for control 
transfer in most of Europe. While the mandatory bid rule in the draft directive is unambiguously 
detrimental to promoting restructuring, it may or may not be good for minority protection: The rule 
increases the compensation to minority shareholders in case of a successful takeover, but it 
decreases the likelihood of a takeover. Which effect dominates is ultimately an empirical issue.  
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Introducing the break-through rule effectively undermines the mandatory bid rule, opening up block 
trades and making possible value-reducing and value-increasing bids previously prevented by the 
latter rule. The break-through rule alone would unambiguously promote takeover activity and 
contestability, essentially by lowering the cost of a successful bid. However, since the rule 
fundamentally alters the initial contracts of the controlling owners, it represents a massive ex post 
government intervention, introducing uncertainty into the fundamental property rights regime with 
large potential ex ante costs for entrepreneurship and the willingness of controlling owners to 
exercise corporate governance. These costs have to be weighed against potential benefits. 
 
So we find that while increased contestability is a worthwhile goal for European takeover 
regulation, its exact meaning must be understood in the context of existing ownership and control 
arrangements in Europe. Contestability is clearly desirable in that it disciplines controlling owners 
and managers, and it raises the potential that more efficient owners and managers may come in 
control. But contestability is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for good corporate 
governance at the level of the individual firm. There are many examples of successful family firms 
where control is not and has never been contestable. In the system as a whole contestability must be 
weighed against any negative effects it might have on incentives for entrepreneurial activity and 
monitoring by large controlling shareholders, and on the protection of minority investors. 
 
Our analysis suggests that relying solely on hostile takeovers to increase contestability is not 
recommendable. Hostile takeovers do not guarantee that the existing corporate resources are 
managed more efficiently. While they can mitigate agency problems between managers and 
shareholders, hostile takeovers are naturally subject to the same agency problems as any corporate 
decision. Hostile takeovers are also only one of many mechanisms in the larger corporate 
governance system. Like other takeovers, these mechanisms have their costs and benefits. And 
since the various corporate governance mechanisms are complementary and highly interconnected, 
changes in one component almost always entail some costs. The challenge in corporate governance 
is to balance the costs and benefits of these different mechanisms in terms of how they affect the 
larger system.  
 
Creating a level-playing field in the market for corporate control is a noble objective. But as our 
analysis clearly demonstrates, a level-playing field is not the same as harmonization of takeover 
regulation. Specific rules have very different effects in different environments. In particular, the 
effects of the mandatory bid rule and a break-through rule of the type proposed by the Winter 
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Group depend on the ownership and control structure in the target firm. Given the considerable 
variation in ownership and control within the European Union, most notably between the UK and 
the rest of Europe, the mandatory bid rule, for instance, impedes the takeover of a typical German 
firm with its controlling owners, but not that of a typical UK firm with its dispersed ownership.  
 
The paper starts by examining the variation in the level and type of takeover activity within Europe 
and the various “barriers” potentially explaining this variation. While there are several contributing 
factors, we argue that the prevalence of controlling blocks is the single most important “barrier” 
limiting hostile takeovers. Using recently accumulated data we provide a more detailed account of 
the patterns of ownership and control in European firms. In the next section (Section 3) we discuss 
the principles of takeover regulation, and Section 4 describes national takeover regulation and 
attempts to regulate takeovers at the EU-level. Takeover regulation is closely linked to corporate 
governance, and in Section 5 we discuss the interrelationship. Section 6 provides an economic 
analysis of defensive measures, mandatory bid rule, and break-through rule. In Section 7 we discuss 
our findings and conclude with some policy recommendations in Section 8. 
 
2.Ownership and Control in Corporate Europe 
 
The overriding concern of the Commission is to promote restructuring of European industry. Even 
though there are large fluctuations over time in individual countries, the general perception is that, 
at least during the 1970s and the 1980s, the United States has been more successful in restructuring 
its industry (Holmström and Kaplan, 2001). A considerable share of this restructuring was achieved 
through hostile takeovers, and even when transactions were negotiated the potential of a hostile bid 
played an important role. Within Europe hostile takeovers were primarily confined to the United 
Kingdom. Hostile takeovers in the sense of tender offers launched in the market have been very rare 
in Continental Europe, at least until recently. For instance, in 1989 there were only four hostile 
takeovers in all the rest of the EU15, compared to 36 in the UK (Becht et al., 2002). The turnover of 
control was also much higher in the UK with the number of friendly transactions alone clearly 
outnumbering those on the European Continent.   
 
During the 1990s the picture changed somewhat with a large increase in the total number of control 
transactions, but the number of hostile takeovers remained negligible until the last few years of the 
1990s. In fact, in 1999 the number of hostile takeovers was the same in the UK and the rest of the 
EU15. However, seen in relation to the size of the economy, hostile takeovers played a much more 
important role in the UK than in the rest of the European Union (Becht et al., 2002). However, there 
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was some variation among the rest of the countries. In particular, Sweden had a total of about 250 
takeovers during the period 1990-2001, which corresponds to 9 per cent of the number of listed 
firms or about the same number of friendly control transactions per listed firm (Berglöf et al., 
2003). In Germany with a much larger number of listed firms and an even larger economy the 
corresponding figure was about 100.  
 
Interestingly, in the US overall restructuring activity remained about the same despite a drop in the 
level of hostile takeovers during the 1990s, with a brief resurgence in the middle of the decade. This 
decline in hostile control transactions can be largely attributed to the increasingly management-
friendly judges in key US states, such as Delaware, where most large companies are incorporated 
(Holmström and Kaplan, 2001). A series of court decisions came out in favor of managerial 
defenses and of a broad interpretation of the business judgment rule giving management discretion 
over key strategic decisions. 
 
In interpreting these numbers it is important to remember that hostile and friendly may be harder to 
differentiate than the names may suggest. The distinction is normally based on whether the board in 
the target firm supported the bid. But the vote of the board could be influenced by many things, 
including the prospects of the bid eventually succeeding. In fact, many seemingly friendly 
transactions have hostile components. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2002) document a considerable 
degree of hostility in a number of control transactions in Germany that fall outside of the official 
classification of hostile takeovers. 
 
Control blocks are also traded without formal takeovers taking place. Köke (2000) examines a 
larger sample of almost 1000 German firms (large listed, medium sized and/or non-listed firms) 
over the years 1987 to 1994. He finds that there is significant trading in large share blocks, and that 
the vast majority of these transactions involve controlling blocks. On average, 7 per cent of control 
changes per year in Germany compared to 6.3 per cent in Belgium, to 6.7 per cent in the US, and to 
9 per cent in the UK. Such changes in control are typically followed by increased management and 
board turnover, more asset restructuring and layoffs.   
 
In addition, there is an active “private” market for corporate assets and corporate control outside the 
public exchanges (Wymeersch, 1998). In terms of number of transactions, about half the number of 
transactions taking place worldwide involve European companies.  These transactions mostly 
involve privately owned firms, including subsidiaries and divisions of listed corporations. Both in 
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terms of numbers of transactions and of turnover, this market exceeds the markets for public 
takeover bids. 
 
 
2.1 Barriers to takeover 
 
A number of features of the Continental European (or non-UK) economies have been put forward 
as explaining these differences in the level of takeover activity. These so-called takeover barriers 
are functionally similar to takeover defenses in that they both help to entrench target management 
(Ferrarini, 2000). Takeover barriers are common in Continental Europe, while takeover defenses are 
widely used in the US. Takeover defenses may be divided into pre-bid and post-bid defenses.  
 
Takeover barriers may be further broken down into structural and technical barriers. Structural 
barriers are part of the institutional setting, such as influence of banks (Hausbank), ownership 
structure, and size of the equity market. Technical barriers are part of each individual firm’s 
governance structure laid down in the corporate charter and allocate the powers among its 
constituencies (shareholders, management, workers, etc.). Examples of such common technical 
barriers that are specifically aimed at frustrating hostile bids are restrictions on the transferability of 
shares and voting restrictions. Dual-class shares, pyramidal groups, and cross-shareholdings are 
devices to separate ownership and control, thereby providing also protection against unfriendly 
acquisition attempts. 
 
We will focus our discussion on ownership and control as a barrier to takeovers, but let us first 
briefly discuss the other suggested structural barriers. All of these barriers are, more or less, 
associated with Germany, but not only with that country. The case for co-determination and close 
bank-firm relationships as barriers to takeovers rests on the argument that employees and banks 
naturally form alliances with incumbent management or controlling owners. This, in turn, hinges on 
the distribution of gains from takeovers, the assumption being that employees and creditors would 
somehow lose out (compare the arguments of Pagano and Volpin (2001) and Cespa and Cestone 
(2002)). Empirical evidence from the US suggests that wage cuts explain only a small fraction of 
the takeover premium (for a survey of the evidence, see Burkart (1999)). And there is little evidence 
that creditors would suffer substantial losses in takeovers.1 
                                                          
1 A close relationship to a bank is not always a guarantee against a hostile bid. Franks and Mayer (1998) show that in all the three 
cases of post-WWII hostile takeovers in Germany did the target company’s house bank exert considerable influence over the 
outcome through the chairmanship of the supervisory board (this is probably also true for the many of the cases of potential hostile 
bids that never materialized).  
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As for the size of equity markets as a structural barrier it is undoubtedly true that only firms listed 
on exchanges can be subjected to hostile bids. If, as in for example Germany and Italy, only a small 
share of the total number of the country’s firms are listed, then this constitutes a limit to 
contestability of control in that country’s industry. An obvious way to foster contestability is to 
encourage public listings of firms. Takeover regulation indirectly affects the incentives to list 
through its impact on the distribution of gains from a future takeover bid. Obviously, takeover rules 
that create uncertainty about fundamental property rights of the controlling owner also discourage 
listings. 
 
2.2. Ownership and Control 
 
Ownership and control in Corporate Europe is put forth as a serious obstacle to hostile takeovers 
and possibly to restructuring more generally. Recent comparable data on ownership and control 
collected within the European Corporate Governance Network (summarized in a recent volume 
edited by Barca and Becht, 2001) allow us to form a better view of the extent of entrenchment.  
 
Corporate Europe spans a wide range of ownership and control structures, ranging from closely-
held family firms to firms with widely dispersed shareholdings, but as in much of the rest of the 
world most companies have a large controlling shareholder (Barca and Becht, 2001; and La Porta et 
al., 1999). Corporations in the UK (and the US) stand out as having more widely dispersed 
ownership than the rest of the world, but there is also considerable variation in ownership 
concentration within Continental Europe. In half of listed non-financial firms in Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, and Italy a single shareholder controls more than 50 per cent of the votes (compared to 
9.9 per cent in the UK). In Dutch, Spanish, and Swedish firms the median blockholder holds 43.5, 
34.5, and 34.9 per cent, respectively.  
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of firms by the size of the largest voting block in some selected 
countries. (When the dotted line is far below (above) the diagonal line, there are few (many) firms 
with large controlling blocks.) These distributions suggest a broad spectrum of ownership and 
control structures with large blockholders on the European Continent. In some cases the 
owner/manager controls a majority of the votes, and in others the largest blockholder has opted for 
a blocking minority stake. Also the observed clustering at certain levels of voting power illustrates 
the impact of laws and regulation. For instance, the dotted line for Germany exhibits steps at 25 per 
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cent (blocking minority), 50 per cent (simple majority) and 75 per cent (common qualified 
majority). 
Insert FIGURE 1 
 
But the amount of votes controlled by the largest shareholder is but one dimension shaping the 
governance structure in a firm. Other relevant aspects include how the large shareholder secures 
control, how the remaining voting and return rights are held, and the relationship between the 
controlling shareholder and top management. Moreover, it is interesting to know the identity of the 
controlling owners. 
 
Most countries allow at least one of the three principal mechanisms for separating control from 
ownership (of cash flow rights): (1) shares with differentiated voting power; (2) pyramiding where 
control is exercised through several layers of companies; and (3) cross-holdings where a firm 
directly or indirectly controls its own shares. Pyramiding is the most effective device for separating 
ownership and control in that it is multiplicative (rather than additive as for vote differentiation). 
Assuming that 50 per cent is necessary for controlling a firm, pyramiding by adding one layer 
allows control in the firm at the bottom with a mere 25 per cent of the equity (.5 x .5 per cent). The 
multiplier between capital and votes in the pyramid is 1/(1/2)n where n denotes the number of levels 
in the pyramid. In other words, the vote multiplier is 4. 
 
These control enhancing mechanisms are sometimes used together. By combining shares with 
different voting power and pyramiding, a controlling owner can maintain control over the company 
at the bottom of the pyramid with even smaller shares of its cash flow rights. Bennedsen and 
Nielsen (2002) have calculated that one-fifth of firms listed on European exchanges make use of 
differentiated votes, with the practice being particularly widespread in Scandinavia. Faccio and 
Lang (2002) report that pyramids are used by 19 per cent of listed European firms that have a 
controlling shareholder at the 20 per cent level. Pyramids are most prevalent in Norway (33.9 per 
cent) and least prevalent in Finland (7.46 per cent). Crossholdings are also used in Germany but are 
marginal in other countries. The ownership and control structure where the owner/manager has sold 
out the majority of shares to dispersed shareholders but retains control is denoted a controlling 
minority shareholder. The possibility to control firms with limited equity stakes is at the heart of 
much of the corporate governance debate in Continental Europe. 
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The voting and return rights not controlled by the largest shareholder can be held in several ways. 
The shares could be widely dispersed, but several large shareholders with substantial blocks of 
shares are also common (Barca and Becht, 2001). For a sample of 5232 European companies, 
Faccio and Lang (2002) find that 39 per cent of firms have at least two shareholders owning 10 per 
cent or more of votes, and 16 per cent have three shareholders, each owning at least 10 per cent of 
the votes. In order to evaluate the role of additional large blockholdings we need to know more 
about the relationship between the largest blockholder and other blockholders. A controlling 
minority shareholder could have sold a large block to a friendly investor. Alternatively, an investor 
could have accumulated a substantial block of previously dispersed shares more or less against the 
desire of the controlling owner/manager. Whether the other large blockholders are essentially 
friendly or hostile is going to shape the dynamics of corporate governance in the firm. 
 
The identity of the controlling owner is also likely to shape the nature and dynamics of corporate 
governance. Recent empirical research has tried to penetrate these complex, often multi-layered, 
ownership and control arrangements in search of ultimate controlling owners (LaPorta et al., 1999; 
and Faccio and Lang, 2002). Most publicly traded firms in Europe are either widely held or family 
controlled. There is, however, a marked difference in the ranking of these two categories across 
Europe. In Continental Europe, as in most other countries of the world, family controlled firms are 
in the majority. By contrast, widely held firms clearly outnumber family controlled firms in the UK 
and Ireland. To understand the predominance of family control we need to answer the question 
why, in the first place, founders and investors retain large controlling stakes in firms. After all, 
abstaining from diversification is costly and controlling blocks are typically rather illiquid. 
Individuals and organizations forgo diversification benefits in order to induce those in charge of 
running the company to take decisions that are in the interests of the suppliers of finance 
(shareholders). As we will illustrate below, ownership of large blocks - whether by manager or by 
outside blockholder – is, however, not unequivocally positive but comes with costs and benefits.   
 
3. Promoting Takeover versus Protecting Minority Interests 
 
Takeover regulation - whether implicitly or explicitly - influences how the takeover gains are shared 
between the bidding and the target firm, and thereby affects the incentives to undertake respectively 
accept a bid. Since granting one side, say the bidder, a larger fraction of the takeover gains 
necessarily implies that target shareholders receive less of the surplus, any takeover regulation has 
to confront the trade-off between promoting the mobility of corporate control and protecting small  
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(minority) shareholders. To illustrate this general point we briefly review the well-known “free-
rider problem”, identified by Grossman and Hart (1980), which is central to the understanding of 
both how the tender offer process functions and how regulation affects (the incidence of) takeovers. 
Thereafter, we turn our attention to the current takeover regulations in Europe. As we will argue the 
impact, relevance, and desirability of a specific takeover rule crucially depend on the corporate 
governance system to which it is applied.   
  
In their seminal paper, Grossman and Hart (1980) show that managers who are either inefficient or 
pursue self-serving actions need not be vulnerable to a takeover bid, even though – or more 
accurately precisely because - ownership is widely dispersed. Each small shareholder rightly 
presumes that his decision to tender has a negligible impact on the tender offer outcome. 
Accordingly, a shareholder only finds it in his interest to tender if the offered bid price at least 
matches the post-takeover share value. Otherwise, he prefers to “free-ride”. By not tendering, he 
captures the whole value improvement that the bidder can generate. As all small shareholders 
behave in the same manner the bidder makes zero profit on the shares acquired in the tender offer. 
Or putting it differently, a success of a value-increasing bid is a public good for the target 
shareholders, but each individual shareholder has an incentive not to tender in order to “free-ride”. 
As a result, there are too few takeover attempts, and if a takeover occurs, most of the gains go to 
target shareholders.2 This latter implication of the “free-rider” result is confirmed by numerous 
empirical studies (Burkart 1999).   
 
The literature has suggested two ways to mitigate the “free-rider” problem, both of relevance in the 
context of (European) takeover legislation. Grossman and Hart (1980) propose to allow bidders to 
dilute the value of the post-takeover minority shares. Excluding minority shareholders from part of 
the takeover gains creates a wedge between the post-takeover share value to the bidder and that to 
the minority shareholders. This implies that shareholders are willing to tender already at a price at 
which the bidder still makes a profit.3 Note also that the bid price does not depend upon whether or 
not restricted bids are banned. With or without the mandatory bid rule, the bidder simply offers a 
                                                          
2 Other (complementary) reasons why a bidder may fail to make a profit are competition by other bidders and defensive 
actions by the incumbent management.  
3 Another way to overcome the “free-rider problem” is to grant a successful bidder a squeeze-out right, i.e., the right to 
compel remaining minority shareholders to sell their shares (Yarrow 1985). The squeeze-out right affects the tendering 
decision in a similar manner as the dilution of minority shareholder rights. When an offer conditional upon acceptance 
of the freeze-out fraction succeeds, any remaining minority shareholder will be forced to sell his shares on the terms of 
the original offer. Hence, he may as well accept the original offer. The Commission’s latest draft directive (October 
2002) introduces the squeeze-out right with a threshold of between 90 to 95 per cent of the equity capital. 
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price equal to the post-takeover minority share value, and the shareholders neither gain nor lose 
from tendering their shares (given that the takeover succeeds ).4  
 
The above argument illustrates how (takeover) regulation can affect the distribution of takeover 
gains and thereby the bidder’s incentives to undertake a bid as well as the target shareholders’ 
incentive to accept it. It also makes the conflict between promoting takeovers and protecting 
minority interests very transparent.5 Strong (minority) shareholder protection discourages bidders 
because their profits are eroded by the target shareholders’ “free-rider” behaviour. Hence, a 
takeover mechanism that fulfills its role of creating wealth by exploiting synergies and of 
disciplining management relies on granting bidders benefits that do not accrue to other shareholders 
on a pro-rata basis. Such private benefits conflict with equal treatment and protection of minority 
shareholders. Consequently, a functioning market for corporate control cannot be pursued 
separately from the protection of minority shareholders, but one goal has to be traded-off against the 
other. To the extent that shareholder protection is tantamount to increasing the target shareholders’ 
share of the takeover gains it diminishes the bidder’s private benefits, thereby resulting in a less 
active market for corporate control.  
 
This trade-off also implies that maximum minority protection is not in the target shareholders’ best 
interest. Less shareholder protection improves the bidder’s profit prospect and thereby increases the 
likelihood that the shareholders collect a takeover premium. From their perspective, the optimal 
amount of protection maximizes the expected takeover premium, i.e., strikes a balance between a 
higher bid price in the event of a takeover and a lower probability of a takeover.  
 
A closely related point is that minority protection aimed at restricting the dilution of minority shares 
does not serve as a screening device.6 As shown in “Box I: Bidder Screening and Minority 
Protection”, better minority protection does not frustrate those bids where the bidder is the primary 
recipient of the takeover gains without discouraging even more those bids where the gains are more 
                                                          
4 The argument implicitly assumes that the takeover is value increasing with a post-takeover minority share value that 
exceeds the current share value under the incumbent management.  In a more general single bidder setting where the 
takeover may or may not be value increasing, the mandatory bid rule can prevent that minority shareholders incur a loss 
relative to the current share value. However, the mandatory bid rule never simultaneously secures a bid premium and 
provides effective protection: Either the status quo (current share value) determines the bid price in which case the 
takeover premium is zero, or the post-takeover minority share value determines the bid price in which case the 
mandatory bid rule has no impact (Burkart 1999).  
5 Like other takeover regulations such as the UK City Code and the federal US regulation, both the Winter Report and 
the various (failed) drafts for a takeover directive endorse protection of (minority) shareholder interests and a 
functioning market for corporate control as main regulatory objectives.  
6 As shown below in Box II, rules that impose a minimum price in a control transaction, such as the mandatory bid rule, 
can to some extent screen between bidders.  
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evenly shared.7 Due to the free-rider behaviour, better protection raises the bid price for “good” 
bidders (who bring large efficiency gains) and “bad” bidders (who extract large private benefits). 
Since the profit margin of good bidders is typically smaller than that of bad bidders, better 
protection is more likely to discourage good bidders.  
 
Insert BOX I 
 
A second solution to the free-rider problem is the acquisition of a stake prior to the tender offer 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). If the pre-takeover price of the stake is relatively low, the bidder earns 
a profit on this stake, making the takeover profitable, even if all tendered shares are acquired at the 
full post-takeover value. Indeed, pre-takeover holdings are found to have a positive impact on 
bidder gains and on the success probability of takeovers (Burkart, 1999).  
 
The ease and extent to which a bidder can accumulate an initial stake through secret open market 
purchases depend on the market depth and the disclosure requirement. Once a bidder has to disclose 
his identity (and holdings), further open market purchases become increasingly less attractive. Thus, 
by limiting the numbers of shares that a bidder can acquire before submitting a public tender offer, 
disclosure requirements affect the division of takeover gains. When choosing a disclosure threshold, 
a regulator faces again the trade-off between promoting takeovers and protecting minority interests. 
Lax disclosure standards allocate a larger share of the takeover gains to the bidder, thereby 
promoting an active takeover market. This, however, comes at the expense of those shareholders 
that sold their shares prior to the bid, thereby forgoing the takeover premium.  
 
Instead of accumulating an initial stake through open market purchases, the bidder may seek out a 
large shareholder and negotiate a block sale. Even though the bidder has to surrender part of the 
subsequent takeover gains on the block to the incumbent blockholder, a block trade may be more 
profitable than accumulating a stake through secret open market purchases. Thus, the existence of 
large shareholdings facilitates takeovers relative to a firm with dispersed ownership. The 
blockholder’s ability to promote a takeover by either selling or tendering his shares also allows him 
to impede it by retaining his shares. Both increase with the block size, or more precisely with the 
associated number of votes, and an incumbent shareholder with a majority of the votes can 
unilaterally accept or reject a takeover attempt. This latter possibility has been a main concern in 
                                                          
7 This reasoning implicitly assumes that there is no competition among bidders. When multiple bidders compete for a 
target, bids and counterbids typically drive the price up beyond the level imposed by minority protection, making the 
latter a non-binding constraint. 
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debate on EU takeover regulation in those cases where a majority of votes is controlled with a much 
smaller proportion of the equity capital.     
 
4. Takeover Regulation in Europe  
 
This section describes the regulatory framework governing control transfers at the level of Member 
States and provides a brief account of the attempts to regulate takeovers at the level of the EU, 
including the recommendations of the Winter Group and the Commission’s draft directive (October 
2002).  
 
4.1. National Regulation 
 
Following several highly publicized takeovers the UK introduced in 1968 its self-regulatory City 
Code on Takeovers and Mergers, which has since been revised and expanded several times. The 
purpose of the code is to ensure fair and equal treatment of all shareholders in connection with 
corporate takeovers and to provide an orderly framework within which takeovers are conducted. To 
this end, the code regulates the actions of bidders prior to the announcement of the bid, the content 
of the information issued to shareholders by bidder and target companies, and the defensive 
measures available to the target companies.  
 
With respect to the two most debated aspects of takeover regulation, the mandatory bid rule and the 
scope for defensive actions, the City Code adopts strict versions. First, the code obliges a party who 
reaches through purchases the threshold of 30 per cent of the voting rights in a listed company to 
make an offer to buy the remaining shares. The price in the mandatory offer may be no less than 
any price paid within the preceding 12 months. Second, the code prohibits managers from taking 
any defensive action without shareholder consent once an offer is made or seems imminent. It 
further forbids explicitly the issue of retained shares and options, the sale or acquisition of assets of 
a material amount, and entering into contracts otherwise than in the ordinary course of business.   
 
Until the 1980s takeover regulation remained essentially a UK (and US) phenomenon. In most 
Continental European countries takeover bids were still so rare that special regulations were long 
thought to be unnecessary. Acquisitions traditionally were based on negotiations between the 
acquirer and the target company's management, and transactions took place outside the public 
exchanges. During the latter part of the 1980s, however, activity in European stock markets 
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increased dramatically, as did the number of takeover bids targeted directly at the shareholders – in 
some cases with no prior negotiations at all and in others after negotiations had proved 
unsuccessful. Cross-border corporate takeovers also increased as wrestling control of companies in 
other countries through public takeover bids became more accepted. 
 
In response to these developments most Member States first adopted some form of self-regulation 
and later opted for binding legal rules, but some countries have maintained self-regulatory regimes  
see Table 1). These national regulations are strongly influenced by the British example. In fact, the 
City Code has served as the standard in many areas such as information and disclosure, conduct 
during the offer, or competing offers (Hopt, 2002). This does, however, not apply to the mandatory 
bid rule and defensive measure where some Member States opted for different provisions.  
 
Almost all Member States have adopted some form of mandatory bid rule, either through self-
regulation or by law, but the design of rules differs across jurisdictions. The UK has the most 
extreme form of mandatory bid rule that effectively prevents the acquisition of a controlling block 
at a premium. Continental European mandatory bid rules are typically less demanding, allowing 
either for a price discount or restricting the quantity of the outstanding shares that the rival is 
obliged to acquire (Ferrarini, 2002). The level of blockholding triggering a mandatory bid also 
differs across Member States (see Table 1). Defensive measures by incumbents have also been 
regulated in most Member States. In general, boards may only take such measures after approval 
from shareholders. In Germany, however, shareholders can approve measures in advance, in effect 
giving the supervisory board considerable leeway in responding to takeover bids.  
 
To summarise, national regulations within the EU have gradually converged to the UK rules, and 
today variation across Member States is limited. Though there remain some differences as to the 
mandatory bid rule and the scope of the board to take defensive action, most notably in Germany. 
Overall investor protection has probably been strengthened through the introduction of mandatory 
bid rules, at the expense of mobility on the market for control. But the increasing emphasis on 
shareholder approval of defensive measures has moderated this shift. Thus, there is little evidence 
of a “race-to-the-bottom” in the sense of no regulation.  
 
This picture contrasts sharply with that of the United States which has a dual regime with both 
federal and state laws. The principal federal legislation (The Williams Act) is aimed at procedural 
disclosure rules in the tender offer process. The Williams Act does not interfere with the power of a 
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firm to resist a takeover bid under its corporate charter. But contrary to the EU, the US has a single 
standard on the accountability of a target firms’ board comparable to the well-established business 
judgment rule, fiduciary duties relatively homogeneously defined in the US. (Hopt, 2002). It is 
worthwhile to note that US federal regulation contains no mandatory bid rule. State laws vary 
considerably across the US. Many states have many antitakeover statutes (Delaware has only one)8 
– Delaware is the only state that has a well-developed case law on the use of defensive tactics. 
Mandatory bid rules only exist in Pennsylvania and Maine.  
 
Defensive tactics are within the business discretion of the boards of directors and are widely used.9 
In fact, most S&P 500 firms and a vast majority of those firms listed on the NYSE or Amex are 
covered by several anti-takeover devices, ranging from poison pills, supermajority amendments to 
state anti-takeover laws (Burkart, 1999). Court challenges have also become an important defensive 
weapon in takeover bids, and hostile takeover activity dropped substantially in the US during the 
1990’s (Holmström and Kaplan, 2001). The board can, however, only act as a fiduciary of the 
shareholders and these strong fiduciary duties are upheld by the American courts (Hopt, 2002). 
States, like Delaware, which have granted managers broad discretion in implementing takeover 
defences with reference to the so-called business judgment rule, have been more successful in 
attracting incorporations.  
 
Regulatory competition has generally served the interests of incumbent management (Bebchuk et 
al., 2002). Despite the variation in treatment across jurisdictions, the extent of regulatory 
competition should not be exaggerated. For most companies the choice has in effect stood between 
incorporating in Delaware or the company’s home state. Moreover, state courts have acted in the 
shadow of possible federal intervention. The recent reaction in Congress to the spectacular 
governance failures in companies like Enron and WorldCom with the passage of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act also illustrates the latent threat of intervention from the legislator. On several occasions, 
most notably in the aftermath of the Great Depression, federal authorities propelled by political 
populism asserted theirs powers to break up corporate governance arrangements. Prior to these 
interventions ownership and control structures in the United States resembled those of present-day 
Continental Europe. 
 
                                                          
8 There are five standard types of antitakeover statutes; control share acquisition statutes, fair price statutes, business 
combination statutes, poison pill endorsement statutes, and constituency statues (Bebchuk et al.,2002). 
9 The board can, however, only act as a fiduciary of the shareholders and these strong fiduciary duties are upheld by the 
American courts (Hopt, 2002). 
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4.2. EU Takeover Regulation 
 
The first attempts to harmonize takeover regulation in the EU date back to the early 1970s when the 
European Commission appointed professor Robert Pennington to draw up a draft directive for 
takeover bids.10 Like later drafts, this draft was strongly influenced by the UK City Code. The draft 
was discussed for a couple of years with representatives of the Member States, but interest was 
limited and eventually the entire project was folded. Ten years later the directive plans resurfaced 
and at the end of the 1980’s the European Commission presented a proposal for a 13th Company 
Law Directive. The draft was widely criticized and interest among Member States was once again 
limited.  
 
However, in January 1988 the situation changed overnight when the Italian businessman Carlo de 
Benedetti extended a bid for a controlling stake in the giant Belgian holding company Société 
Générale de Belgique, thereby starting one of Europe's most controversial takeover fights to date, 
involving numerous dubious defensive measures and unveiling a considerable void at the core of 
European takeover regulation. The battle for the company accelerated the Commission's directive 
plans. At the urging of the European Parliament, the Commission in January 1989 presented a 
completed proposal for a takeover directive. The proposal triggered an intense debate on the forms 
of a European Takeover Directive. Apart from strong objections against individual provisions, 
many argued that a directive should be limited to certain basic principles for national rules, while 
leaving the details to Member States to decide on. By the end of 1991 the Commission announced 
its intention to prepare yet another draft proposal which would take into account criticism raised. 
 
The new proposal appeared five years later in 1996 and was amended several times, following 
comments from the first reading in the European Parliament, intense negotiations within the 
Council, and a protracted conciliation procedure with the European Parliament. The new proposal 
was a proposal for a “framework directive”, containing general principles that Member States 
would be obliged to follow when drafting their national takeover codes. To silence British 
opposition Member States would even be permitted to implement the directive also through self-
regulation. The Council had also given in to German resistance on several substantive points, but 
there was one area where the willingness to compromise ran into a wall – the issue of defensive 
                                                          
10 See Skog (2002) for a thorough account of the history of (attempted) takeover regulation at the EU level. 
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measures. The common position stated that such measures could only be enacted with the approval 
of the general meeting after a bid is announced.11 After extended negotiations the draft finally was 
rejected by the smallest possible margin – one vote.12 
  
Despite this defeat the Commission remained committed to the idea of a European takeover 
regulation. In September 2001 the Commission set up a ‘High Level Group of Company Law 
Experts’ under the leadership of Jaap Winter with the task of providing independent advice on 
issues related to the harmonization of European corporate law, including rules for takeovers. In 
January 2002 the Winter Group presented its recommendations on takeover regulation building on 
the rejected directive. As guiding principles for the creation of a level-playing field the Group 
advocated shareholder decision-making and proportionality between risk-bearing capital and 
control. Applying these two principles, the Group made the following main recommendations: 
 
(1) The price in a mandatory bid should be equal to the highest price paid by the bidder during 
the 6 to 12 preceding months.  The mandatory bid should be made within a short period after 
control has been acquired. The exact definition of the ‘level of control’ is left for the 
Member States to decide. 
(2) The board of the target company must obtain prior shareholder approval before taking any 
frustrating actions once a takeover bid has been announced. 
(3) A bidder who acquires 75 per cent (or more) of the equity capital should be able to override 
any obstacle including voting differentiation13 that prevents him from taking control over the 
firm (so called break-through rule). Furthermore, the bidder does not have to compensate the 
holder of shares carrying disproportionate voting rights or special control rights.  
(4) Dual-class shares, voting caps, and other limitations to voting rights are to be voided in 
votes on defensive measures once a takeover bid has been announced. 
 
                                                          
11 German opposition was intense throughout this process, and ultimately Germany no longer backed the common 
position in the Council, but was voted down 14 to 1 three times within the Council.  
12 After the conciliation process, it was for the European Parliament in plenary to vote on the matter, normally little 
more than a formality. During the discussion, however, it became evident that differences in opinion split both the 
conservative and socialist camps and that the vote would therefore be “free.” In the end, Parliament rejected the 
conciliation compromise with the smallest possible margin of 1 vote. The defeat is all the more surprising when 
considering that the proposed directive was also crafted on the UK rules, making the difference between proposed 
directive and national regulation much smaller than during previous reform attempts. The directive failed because of the 
strong (German) opposition against the restrictions in the board’s discretion over the use of defensive measures. The 
resistance was primarily based on a perceived asymmetry vis-à-vis the US, where most firms are effectively shielded 
from hostile takeovers. 
 
13 Company-specific barriers that should remain outside the scope of the break-through rule are provisions restricting 
the transferability of shares, contractual barriers to takeover bids and pyramid structures. 
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Recommendations (1) and (2) endorse the controversial provisions of the failed takeover directive, 
while recommendations (3) and (4) go much further. They aim at removing a controlling minority 
shareholder’s veto power over a takeover bid. In addition, the Group recommended the introduction 
of the right for a majority shareholder to buy out minority shareholders (squeeze-out right), and of 
the right for minority shareholders to compel the majority shareholder to purchase their shares (sell-
out right). As a threshold for triggering both squeeze-out and sell-out right, the Group proposed 90 
or 95 per cent of the equity capital.  
 
In October 2002 the Commission presented a new draft directive. This latest proposal has the same 
scope and principles as it predecessors, but also incorporates some of the recommendations made 
by the Winter Group. In particular, it introduces a squeeze-out right and a sell-out right, mandates 
that the bidder pays the same price to controlling and minority shareholders, and it retains the 
principle that shareholders have to approve defensive measures. Because of tremendous opposition 
and because of legal problems, the Commission did not include the break-through rule. The 
proposal, however, voids any restrictions on the transferability of shares and restrictions on voting 
rights against the bidder once a takeover bid has been announced. This new Article 11 removes a 
target firms’ discretion to exclude a bidder from exercising his corresponding voting rights, say 
through voting caps, or to prevent him for purchasing further shares. In contrast to the break-
through rule, differentiation of votes, i.e., a multi-class security voting structure, is not considered to 
constitute such a restriction that is rendered unenforceable by Article 11.  
 
5. Corporate Governance 
 
The market for corporate control and corporate governance are strongly interrelated. Corporate 
governance is concerned with how to allocate control over investment decisions and how to ensure 
that those entrusted with control use the resources efficiently. A critical aspect of any system of 
corporate governance is the extent to which control can be contested, i.e., what it takes to remove 
control from an incumbent manager or controlling owner. Contestability is important ex post 
because it allows control to be reallocated, but ex ante it also potentially affects the behavior of 
those entrusted with control. A number of corporate governance mechanisms have developed for 
resolving the collective action problem among dispersed investors. Hostile takeovers are one 
important such mechanism promoting contestability. But these mechanisms also include large 
blockholder monitoring, managerial compensation schemes, shareholder litigation, and monitoring 
by creditors, in particular banks (for surveys see Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; and Becht et al., 2002). 
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In this section we discuss the role of large (controlling) shareholders in corporate governance and 
the market for corporate control in contesting their control. For the subsequent assessment it is 
important to bear in mind that both ownership concentration and takeover market are interrelated 
with other economic and legal institutions and that their effectiveness as governance mechanisms 
thus depends on the nature of the whole governance system in which they operate. 
 
5.1. Large Shareholders 
 
An investor holding a substantial equity stake has the incentives, i.e., cash flow claims, to engage in 
information acquisition and monitor management. He or she also has considerable voting power to 
put management under pressure. Indeed, several theoretical models show that a large shareholder 
engages in costly monitoring, thereby partially overcoming the collective action problem among 
dispersed shareholders (Becht et al., 2002). Starting with Demsetz and Lehn (1985), numerous 
empirical papers examine the relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
value/performance for a given country, typically the US (for a survey see Holderness (2002)). The 
recent law and finance literature has broadened this debate by analyzing this relationship across 
different legal regimes (countries). In support of the view that large shareholders play a positive 
role, large shareholdings are found to be associated with higher turnover rates of CEOs and 
directors, with lower compensation for top management, and with lower levels of discretionary 
spending, such as advertisement (Denis and McConnell, 2002; Holderness, 2002). However, the 
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of “shareholder activism” in the US finds a negligible 
impact of large institutional owners (Becht et al., 2002). Overall, the international evidence 
indicates that ownership has most often a positive impact on firm value and that this relationship 
varies both by blockholder identity and by country (Denis and McConnell, 2002). As regards the 
latter, ownership concentration is found to have a stronger positive impact on firm performance in 
countries with less legal investor protection.14 
 
Concentrated ownership has, however, also its costs. Indeed, large shareholders can abuse their 
power to extract more benefits possibly at the expense of the small shareholders (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997).15 Not all benefits accruing from controlling a firm can be written into a contract and 
enforced in a court. These so-called private benefits of control, as distinct from the contractible 
                                                          
14 Burkart et al. (2002) show in unified model of managerial succession how family control emerges in regimes with 
weak legal shareholder protection and widely held firms in regimes with good legal protection 
15 Other costs associated with (partial) ownerhip concentration are reduced risk sharing, reduced market liquidity, 
excessive risk taking in highly leveraged firms, or ex post expropriation of managerial rents thereby stifling initiative ex 
ante (Becht et al., 2002). 
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security benefits, can come from many sources. They may come from making decisions that benefit 
a particular investor (or management) at the expense of other investors. Alternatively, they may be 
the power and prestige that is associated with the control over a firm and the influence it may give 
over social and political events. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) propose the term “amenity potential” for 
this latter type of private benefit that does not dilute the claims of other investors but increases total 
utility to investors. Nonetheless, such amenity potential may distort managerial decisions and 
prevent value increasing control shifts from taking place. 
 
The size of private benefits and the extent to which they come at the expense of firm value are a 
source of controversy among researchers. One method to quantify these benefits is to measure the 
difference between the per share price in the sale of a controlling block and the share price after the 
announcement of the block trade. Applying this method, Dyck and Zingales (2001) document 412 
transactions of a controlling block in 39 countries. In some countries private benefits, by this 
measure, appear to be very large. For example, 11 Brazilian transactions show an average premium 
of around 65 per cent, while in the United States and Canada this figure is 2 per cent. In Europe the 
range of variation is somewhat smaller, but in Italy and Portugal the mean premium were 37 and 20 
per cent, respectively, as compared to most other European countries with mean premia below 10 
per cent.16  
 
The authors’ interpretation is that these large valuations of private benefits reflect possibilities to 
steal assets from companies, but they cannot rule out that amenity potential is involved as well. In 
both interpretations, non-contractible private benefits play an important role for the incentives of 
(compensation to) managers and possibly large blockholders. The size of these benefits appears to 
be inversely related to the extent to which a country’s legal rules protect (minority) investors 
(LaPorta et al., 1997 and 1998). Closely related, several studies document that the accumulation of 
control rights in excess of cash flow rights – whether through dual class shares, pyramids or cross-
holdings – has a negative impact on share value, suggesting that private benefit are extracted at the 
expense of small shareholders (Denis and McConnell, 2002).  
 
The conflict between controlling blockholder and minority shareholders may be mitigated by the 
presence of additional blockholders. A second or third blockholder can provide monitoring or 
prevent collusion between controlling blockholder and management. In support of this notion, 
                                                          
16 Measures of private benefits using the control premium should be treated with considerable care since the size of the 
premium depends on many things such as the inequality of voting power, the extent of competition in the market for 
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Lehman and Weigand (2000) find a positive impact of a second blockholder on the profitability of 
German listed firms. Volpin (2002) documents that valuation of Italian firms is higher when a 
voting syndicate, as compared to a single shareholder, controls the firm. Faccio et al. (2001) report 
higher levels of dividends in Western Europe when a second blockholder exist, but the reverse in 
East Asian countries.   
 
To sum up, controlling shareholders can be effective monitors, but they can also extract private 
benefits at the expense of other investors and stakeholders in the firm. Similarly, large equity 
ownership by managers also gives rise to two conflicting (alignment and entrenchment) effects: On 
the one hand, it aligns the interests of the manager with those of the other shareholders, thereby 
leading to better performance. On the other hand, larger equity stakes let managers pursue their own 
goals (possibly at the expense of the shareholder) with less risk of reprisal, i.e., it entrenches 
managers. Both sides of ownership concentration are well documented in numerous empirical 
studies (which often do not distinguish between ownership by managers and outside blockholders).  
The empirical evidence is inconclusive on whether, on balance, the positive or negative effects of 
ownership concentration dominate. Furthermore, ownership concentration is found to be much 
more prevalent in countries with weaker legal protection even though the agency conflict between 
large and small shareholders is exacerbated in these countries. 
 
5.2. Contestability and the Market for Corporate Control 
 
An important aspect of a corporate governance system is the extent to which it allows control 
transfers. Circumstances may and do arise in the evolution of a firm when a change of control is the 
optimal course of action, say because the current CEO proves unable or unwilling to adjust to a new 
environment. The most direct way to achieve contestability is through an active market for 
corporate control. A functioning (hostile) takeover market subjects firms to a continuous auction 
process: whenever an outside party is able to improve the value of existing corporate resources it 
can bid for the firm's control. Thus, takeovers allow to replace incumbent managers, who are either 
less competent or are not acting in the shareholders’ best interest. In addition, the mere threat of a 
takeover affects the behaviour of those entrusted with control, i.e., disciplines them.  
 
Contestability of control should, however, not be the sole criterion. There are other reasons for and 
modes of changing control. A control transfer can also be efficient simply because the controlling 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
corporate control, the size of the block sold, and the distribution of shares in the target firm. The average premium in 
countries also varies over time in ways that are hard to explain (Becht et al., 2002). 
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party wishes to sell. In this case access to a liquid market for control is important for corporate 
governance. Controlling owners may want to cash out for a number of reasons, e.g., lack of a family 
successor, lifetime consumption, or just liquidity needs. The US venture capital industry illustrates 
that the possibility to exit investments is important for encouraging entrepreneurial activity. Venture 
capitalists’ investments are normally not liquid and young firms backed by venture capitalist often 
do not generate significant returns. Venture capitalists realize the returns on their investments 
through private sales of the venture to another firm or initial public offerings and subsequent open 
market sales. The prospect of such exits is crucial for the young firms’ ability to attract venture 
capital in the first place.  
 
The importance of contestability also depends on the nature of the governance system. A 
controlling investor is much less likely to oppose an efficient control transfer because selling is an 
attractive option. By contrast, resistance has much lower opportunity costs for a manager of a 
widely held firm who has nothing to sell. Indeed, managers who gain financially from a successful 
takeover by owning an equity stake are found to resist takeovers less (Burkart, 1999).  
 
Furthermore, contestability has benefits as well as costs. Takeover offers the possibility to bring in a 
new management that can increase firm value, and the threat of a takeover serves as a disciplining 
device. But takeovers may also be the manifestation of the managers’ ability to pursue their own 
interests at the expense of the shareholders. Indeed, most takeovers are undertaken not by corporate 
raiders but by firms headed by professional managers (Burkart, 1999). Similarly, the threat of a 
takeover may exacerbate the agency problem. Rather than disciplining them, the threat may induce 
managers to undertake manager-specific investments that make them less easily replaceable. 
Closely related, the prospect of being fired without proper compensation for current private benefits 
may undermine the manager’s willingness to invest long-term human capital in the firm, and 
shareholders may worry about dilution of their claims in connection with the sale or under new 
management.  
 
Ultimately, the degree of contestability of controlling owners and managers is a product of the 
interaction of all the mechanisms of the corporate governance system. Finding the optimal level of 
contestability is a key problem in corporate governance. The benefits of contestable control rights 
must be weighed against any loss of incentives to engage in entrepreneurial activities or large 
shareholder monitoring. As we have argued, contestability may also come at the expense of 
minority shareholders; the level of minority protection affects the costs of taking over a firm.  
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6. Core Takeover Provisions: An Economic Analysis  
 
In this section we examine the three regulatory measures that are at the center of the takeover 
regulation debate. We first briefly review the familiar arguments in favour of the principle that 
shareholders have to approve defensive measures. Thereafter we analyse the mandatory bid rule and 
the break-through rule. We show that they interact with each other and how their combined effect 
depends on the characteristics of both bidder and target firm. This analysis draws on Bebchuk 
(1994) and Burkart et al. (2000). Bebchuk compares the incidence of majority block transactions in 
the absence of the mandatory bid with the incidence of such control transfers in a regime with the 
mandatory bid rule. Burkart et al. analyse a bidder’s choice between a negotiated block trade and a 
tender offer when attempting to gain control over a firm with a dominant minority shareholder. We 
also provide a more formal treatment of the arguments in separate boxes.  
 
6.1. Takeover Defenses  
 
Many commentators consider takeover defenses as an entrenchment device whereby managers 
protect their private benefits at the expense of the shareholders: By making bids more costly, 
defensive measures reduce the number of takeovers and hence the disciplinary force of the market 
for corporate control. Others argue that defensive measures reinforce the bargaining role conferred 
on management. Since shareholders are too numerous and lack coordination, they need the 
management to negotiate on their behalf. Providing the management with the power to defend the 
company benefits shareholders. It prevents coercive bids and by delaying an initial bid it provides 
the necessary time to generate competition among bidders, once a company has come into play. 
Accordingly, the increase in the bid premium due to defensive measures dominates the negative 
deterrence effect, i.e. the reduction in the probability of a bid. Empirical evidence on takeover 
defenses does not resolve the debate. First, it is not possible to observe how many takeovers have 
been prevented by defensive measures. Second, the evidence on the deterrence effect is 
inconclusive (Becht et al., 2002). 
 
When analyzing defensive measure it is important to distinguish between the impact of defensive 
measures and the power to undertake them. Takeovers may potentially be disruptive for the pursuit 
of long-term profitable strategies, but shareholders should take this into account when accepting or 
rejecting a particular bid or when voting on defensive measures. The conflict of interests between 
managers and shareholders is well documented in the empirical literature (Shleifer and Vishny, 
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1997). This conflict is particularly pronounced in takeovers: the turnover rate for top managers 
significantly increases following the completion of a tender offer, and those managers who lose 
their jobs have difficulties finding another senior executive position (for a survey, see Burkart, 
1999). If a manager can apply defenses without shareholder ratification, he may abuse this 
discretion in order to secure his position. Although it is difficult to distinguish personal motives 
from bargaining on behalf of the shareholders, evidence suggests that managers resist to protect 
their private benefits. For instance, managers seem less inclined to resist when they gain financially 
more from a successful bid. Consequently, shareholders need to supervise the manager's defensive 
actions closely, if they want to ensure that these are indeed taken in their interest. Shareholder 
control is surely improved by giving them the authority over takeover defenses. Thus, defensive 
measures should be subject to shareholder approval. 
 
The new Article 11 of the draft directive rules out ceilings on shareholdings (for bidders) and 
restrictions on the voting rights of already purchased shares. This provision clearly accords with the 
above reasoning and with the principle of shareholder decision-making. It removes the discretion of 
management to veto share purchases by any (potentially) hostile bidder or to limit his voting rights. 
In fact, the rule goes further. It also deprives management of the possibility to try to convince all 
other shareholders to adopt such restrictions against a bidder. Restrictions on transferability and 
voting rights are rendered unenforceable. 
 
  
6.2. Mandatory Bid Rule 
 
In the absence of the mandatory bid rule, a controlling minority shareholder, henceforth the 
incumbent, may sell his block at any price that an outside buyer, henceforth the rival, is willing to 
pay. Also, the rival has no obligations to let minority shareholders participate in the control 
transaction. Hence, such a block sale takes place whenever it is mutually beneficial for incumbent 
and rival. Due to the free-rider behaviour, small shareholders are not willing to sell their shares for 
less than the value of the share after the block trade. Consequently, the rival does not gain from 
making a voluntary tender offer and merely acquires the controlling block.17  
 
Insert BOX II 
                                                          
17 One reason why a rival may nonetheless prefer to acquire all shares is that it enables him to transfer losses and profits 
between firms to minimize his tax obligations. By contrast, with a controlling interest of less than 100 per cent of the 
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As proved in “Box II: Mandatory Bid Rule and Control Transfers”, such control transfers 
necessarily benefit both incumbent and rival, but may have a positive or negative impact on the 
(wealth of the) small shareholders. When the incumbent’s private benefits are relatively small 
compared to the rival’s private benefits, a control transfer can be mutually beneficial even if the loss 
in security benefits exceeds the gains in private benefits. Similarly, when the rival’s private benefits 
are relatively small compared to the incumbent’s private benefits, incumbent and rival may not 
want to trade the block even though a control transfer would be value increasing.  
 
The mandatory bid rule proposed by the Winter Group and the Commission in its latest proposal 
requires the rival to offer small shareholders the same per share price as he has paid the incumbent 
in the block trade. In such an environment, a control transfer takes place only if the rival creates 
sufficient added value that enables him to pay the control premium also to the small shareholders. 
Due to the redistribution from rival to small shareholders, the mandatory bid rule has two opposing 
effects (for details see Box II). On the one hand, it prevents any value decreasing change of control, 
and if a control transfers takes place all parties including the minority shareholders gain. The 
mandatory bid rule forces the rival to internalize any negative externality that a control transfer may 
have on the shares owned by the small shareholders. Consequently, he is never willing to acquire 
the firm, unless a control transfer is efficient. On the other hand, the mandatory bid rule increases 
the likelihood that a value increasing control transfer fails to take place. Having also to pay the 
control premium to the small shareholders can inflate the total purchase price beyond the rival’s 
willingness-to-pay, even though a control transfer would add value. Thus, the mandatory bid rule 
can also impose losses, i.e., forgone share value improvements, on the small shareholders. 
 
Which of the effects dominates is an empirical question. For the US, empirical studies find that 
trades of large blocks (and block formations) are on average associated with abnormal share price 
increases. While the market appraisal of block transfers is more favourable for trades followed by a 
full acquisition, cumulative abnormal returns are also positive when no subsequent full takeover 
occurs (Holderness, 2002). These findings seems to refute the claim that block trades are 
undertaken with the purpose of looting companies at the expense of small shareholders. Even 
though small shareholders are harmed in some transactions, the average share value increases 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
shares, taxes must be paid separately on each firm’s profit, thereby preventing such tax optimization (Bergström et al., 
1994) 
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suggest that improved management is the primary source of gains in block trades.18 Thus, large as 
well as small shareholders benefit from the absence of a mandatory bid rule. But whether this holds 
more generally can only be established through further empirical work. 
 
6.3. The Break-Through Rule 
 
From an economist’s viewpoint, the novel and interesting contribution of the Commission’s Winter 
Group is the break-through rule. The break-through rule enables an investor who holds a certain 
fraction or more of the equity capital to break through the firm’s existing control structure and 
exercise core control rights such as replacing top management. With the proposed threshold of 75 
per cent, the rule implies that current controlling minority shareholders who own less than 25 per 
cent of all shares lose their veto power over a control transfer. Bennedsen and Nielsen (2002) 
identify how many firms in the EU (except for Greece, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) would be 
likely to be affected by the proposed break-through rule. In their sample of 5,126 publicly traded 
European firms 20 per cent have dual (multiple) class shares. In 3 to 5 per cent or 33 to 49 of the 
firms with dual class shares the (group of) controlling owners would lose their veto power over a 
control transfer if the break-through rule were to be applied. In addition, a large number of firms 
with controlling blocks close to the 25 per cent threshold would potentially be affected when 
issuing equity. These firms are mainly from Denmark, Germany, Italy, and Sweden, and 20 to 33 
belong to the group of the largest European firms.   
 
The formal analysis in “Box III: Break-through Rule and Control Allocation” examines how and 
when a controlling minority shareholder is ousted by an outside rival in a regime with a break-
through rule. While the subsequent discussion presuppose a firm where the proposed break-through 
rule eliminates the controlling shareholder’s veto power over a control transfer, much of the 
analysis is also applicable to firms with non-controlling minority owners. Control or substantial 
influence over a firm does not necessarily require a majority of votes. In particular, when the 
remaining shares are dispersed, a minority block may be sufficient. For instance, neither the Ford 
nor the Wallenberg families own a majority of votes.19 
 
                                                          
18 The reported gains to small shareholders do, however, not imply that a control transfer through a block trade is to be 
preferred to a control transfer through a tender offer (Burkart et al., 2000). 
19 In the sample of Bennedsen and Nielsens (2002), 17 per cent of the firms with dual class shares have a dominant 
minority shareholder, who holds (at least) ten times as many voting rights than cash flow rights without possessing the 
majority of votes. Among these firms, a significant number are European top-500 firms, such as Fiat and Ericsson. The 
introduction of the break-through rule would considerably weaken the position of the dominant shareholder. 
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Insert BOX III 
 
By making a firm with a controlling minority shareholder akin to a firm with dispersed ownership 
for which incumbent and rival compete, the break-through rule indeed facilitates the transfer of 
control, as intended by the Winter Group. The intuition for this is as follows: The break-through 
rule gives the rival the option of bypassing the incumbent to take control of the firm rather than 
seeking his agreement. Since the negotiated block trade with subsequent mandatory bid is the more 
expensive mode of gaining control, the rival will always choose to circumvent the incumbent and 
directly make a tender offer. This leaves the incumbent with no other possibility than to compete if 
he wants to retain control. Hence, provided that rival and incumbent can finance bids equal to their 
valuation of the entire firm, the party with the higher valuation prevails. Thus, in the absence of 
wealth constraints, the break-through rule ensures an efficient allocation of corporate control. It 
seems, however, plausible to assume that many - if not all - incumbent controlling minority 
shareholders are financially constrained. If not, they could regain their veto power over a control 
transfer by increasing their block above the 25 per cent threshold. Once wealth constraints are taken 
into account, control allocation need no longer be efficient in a regime with the break-through rule.  
 
When assessing the merits of the break-through rule, it is worthwhile to reflect on the reasons why 
value increasing control transfers may fail in the first place. As shown in Box II, large private 
benefits of the incumbent can prevent efficient control transfers. The Winter Group seems rather 
biased to focus on this explanation and to view controlling minority shareholders as the major 
obstacle to takeovers and corporate restructuring in Europe. The Group seems to forget that the 
mandatory bid rule, that is (in the most stringent form) part of the Group’s recommendations is also 
a reason why value-increasing control transfers can fail. The break-through rule does not only allow 
the rival to bypass the incumbent but also spares him the cost of having to pay all small 
shareholders a control premium. That is, the break-through rule makes value increasing control 
transfers feasible that are frustrated either by the incumbent’s opposition or by the mandatory bid 
rule. Hence, if promoting an active takeover market is a primary objective one may argue in favour 
of a regime that combines break-through rule with no or a less stringent mandatory bid rule. 
 
When the incumbent cannot compete with the outside rival for control, the break-through rule has 
also undesirable effects for the small shareholders as the analysis in “Box IV: Break-Through Rule 
and Minority Protection” establishes. Most notably, the break-through rule can undo the added 
(minority shareholder) protection that the mandatory bid rule provides. It enables the rival to gain 
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control with a bid equal to the post-takeover (minority) share value, thereby putting small 
shareholders in the same position as in a regime without the mandatory bid rule. Furthermore, it 
allows for the possibility that due to the coordination problems among small shareholders a bid 
succeeds even though it is against their collective interests.20   
 
Insert BOX IV 
 
The break-through rule is clearly against the interests of the incumbent controlling minority 
shareholders; it eliminates their veto power over a control transfer and reduces the prospect of 
getting compensated for the forgone private benefits in a control transaction. As a result, controlling 
blocks with less than 25 per cent of the equity capital will (drastically) lose in value. This loss will 
be reflected in smaller (or even zero) price differentials between shares with high voting power and 
shares with low voting power and lower premium paid in block trades to the extent that such 
transactions continue to take place (without triggering a mandatory bid). It also seems likely that 
controlling minority shareholders respond to the introduction of the break-through rule and try to 
circumvent it. One way to undermine the break-through rule is the approval of defensive measures 
in a general shareholder meeting. By virtue of owning a majority of the votes, the controlling 
minority shareholder can de facto unilateral decide to frustrate a bid. The Winter Report shuts down 
this option by prohibiting the use of disproportionate control rights in votes on defense measures.  
 
As already mentioned, raising the block size above the 25 per cent threshold is the most 
straightforward way to neutralize the break-through rule, provided that the necessary funds are 
available. According to the estimates of Bennedsen and Nielsen (2002), this strategy is only a valid 
option for a few firms. The adoption of a pyramidal structure (adding one layer in the pyramid), 
cross-shareholdings, or other devices for separating ownership and control are alternative means to 
avoid the risk of becoming a victim of the break-through rule. In fact, the Winter Group explicitly 
acknowledges that pyramids and dual class shares serve the purpose of keeping control with little 
equity capital. Nonetheless, the Group recommends that the break-through rule should not apply to 
pyramids because it would be too complicated and expensive. Not surprisingly, the Report has been 
criticized for exempting or even promoting pyramids, thereby affecting existing corporate 
governance arrangements asymmetrically (Bebchuk and Hart, 2002).  
 
                                                          
20 The same coordination problem can cause the failure of value increasing takeover bids. All shareholders prefer the 
bid to succeed, but each wants to “free-ride” to get the entire value improvement. That is, the failure of value increasing 
bids is nothing but the flip side of the success of value decreasing bids. 
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Bennedsen and Nielsen (2002) point out that the introduction of the break-through rule may also 
have an impact on firms in which the controlling minority shareholder currently owns more than 25 
per cent of the equity capital. At least some of these firms are likely to be restricted in raising new 
equity capital without falling under the break-through rule. For such firms the break-through rule 
may well increase the cost of new funds or limit its availability.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that that the break-through rule represents a major ex-post intervention in 
the property rights of controlling minority shareholders. Such interventions raise, besides 
fundamental fairness issues, the prospects that there will be more in the future, thus creating 
uncertainty about the basic property rights. In terms of our analysis this would undermine the 
incentives to hold controlling blocks in the first place. 
 
7. Takeover Regulation and Corporate Governance in Europe 
 
The impact of specific regulation differs fundamentally across countries in Europe, largely due to 
the differences in the predominant patterns of ownership and control in individual firms. The 
mandatory bid rule and the break-through rule have no impact when a firm’s shares are widely 
dispersed. When ownership and control are concentrated, more precisely when there are controlling 
minority shareholders with less equity than the threshold for a break-through rule (and the 
controlling owner is wealth-constrained), the two rules have opposite effects. If only the mandatory 
bid rule is binding, it will increase entrenchment. If the controlling owner uses dual-class shares to 
separate ownership and control, he or she may well respond by forming the more control-effective 
pyramids, thus enforcing entrenchment further. We saw that as many as one-fifth of all listed firms 
in Europe used shares with differentiated votes (Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2002). In a substantial 
number of these firms, the controlling owner would incur control losses without receiving any 
compensation. And an even larger group of firms would be constrained in raising equity because 
their control block would otherwise fall below the break-through threshold. 
 
More generally, as our analysis has demonstrated, there are also obvious limits to what can be 
achieved through takeover regulation, in any system. Takeover decisions do themselves suffer from 
agency problems, in fact takeovers may be as much manifestations of agency problems as solutions 
to them. Takeover regulation affects the distribution of the takeover gains among the bidding firm 
and the target firm, and between a controlling owner and minority shareholders in the target, and 
thus the incentives to make bids. But it is not possible to screen out bad bids (primarily motivated 
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by control benefits) without also preventing value enhancing bids. Measures to protect minority 
investors in takeovers increase the costs of taking over, thus reducing contestability. 
 
Achieving contestability in a corporate governance system like that of Continental Europe is not 
trivial. With large controlling stakes the likelihood of a hostile bid succeeding is small. Managerial 
compensation schemes are unlikely to be as powerful, or as important, when a large controlling 
shareholder can easily fire management. Similarly, the board of directors cannot be expected to play 
the same independent function as in a widely held firm, because the members sit there on a mandate 
from the controlling owner. We will return to what could possible be achieved through other 
mechanisms such as institutional investor monitoring, litigation, and media.  
 
Moreover, to the extent that takeover regulation discourages monitoring by controlling shareholders 
this would increase the discretion of managers. Any evaluation of takeover regulation thus has to 
compare not only the costs and benefits of controlling shareholders but also the costs and benefits of 
its alternative, the managerially controlled firm. The evidence on the relative performance of firms 
with controlling owners and those with dispersed shareholders does not yield conclusive results 
(Becht et al., 2002). This should not come as a surprise, given the strong interrelationship between 
competition, the firm’s internal organization and ownership concentration. Moreover, as we 
discussed, such comparisons are extremely difficult since the effects of particular ownership and 
control structures depend critically on the entire corporate governance system.  
 
Comparisons at the level of systems also do not yield clear results. The study by Dyck and Zingales 
(2002) on control benefits using premia in block transactions suggests substantial variations across 
countries, but the differences are rather small among developed market economies. Examinations of 
managerial dismissals following shocks to earnings, cash flows, and stock prices suggest no 
significant differences across countries (Kaplan, 1997). However, the mechanisms through which 
turnovers of management are achieved differ fundamentally. In Japan, for example, the company’s 
house bank becomes more active, while in the United States board activity increases. 
 
Intervening in corporate governance systems is risky exactly because of the interrelationship 
between the different mechanisms. If large shareholder monitoring is effectively shut down, it will 
take time before the other mechanisms adjust. For example, transparency about ownership and 
control structures and about what owners and managers do is still much poorer in many European 
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countries than in the US. The tradition of litigation is very different, and the courts have a rather 
limited role in resolving corporate governance issues in Europe. 
 
8. A Regulatory Framework for Europe 
 
There is widespread agreement that the starting point for any regulatory effort in the area of 
takeover regulation and corporate governance should be contractual freedom. Any intervention 
must be clearly motivated by externalities stemming from corporate governance failures in 
individual firms. Even more important, legally signed contracts should be respected. Extraordinary 
circumstances may require altering contractual rights in existing contracts, such as was done, for 
example, through the recent Sarbanes-Oxley legislation in the US strengthening the liability of 
managers and owners for their financial statements. But these interventions risk creating uncertainty 
about the basic rules and thus undermine the willingness to engage in entrepreneurial activity and 
invest in companies.  
 
Even when regulation is warranted, self-regulation has proven effective in many countries with the 
London Rules as perhaps the most prominent example. However, internationalization and potential 
contagion effects from governance failures in individual firms or on individual exchanges suggest 
that government intervention is warranted. But government intervention can take several forms and 
happen at both the national and EU level. 
 
As we have seen, the London Rules, themselves a result from self-regulation, have served as the 
model for national and EU-level regulators in Europe. But there are at least two alternative 
reference points. One model is that of the US with its predominance of firms with dispersed 
shareholdings and considerable variation in corporate laws across states. Potential competition 
among jurisdictions plays some role in shaping regulation over time, and Delaware has emerged as 
the state par preference for large listed corporations. In the EU context the US model would imply 
an EU-level securities markets regulator and subsidiarity in most aspects of corporate law, but with 
one or two national jurisdictions emerging as the major attractors for large firms. 
 
A second alternative model is that of Canada where corporate law also is state-based but 
considerable coordination takes place at the federal level. The Canadian example combines a 
regulatory framework requiring a high level of transparency à la US with a corporate governance 
system dominated by concentrated shareholdings and extensive separation of ownership and control 
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through pyramiding and differentiation of votes. Minority protection comes primarily from a 
commonly used general clause against oppression of minority interests. Interestingly, Canada had 
the same low level of control premium as the United States in the Dyck and Zingales (2002) study. 
The Canadian model would also allow variation across EU Member States but with extensive 
coordination at the EU level. For Continental European and Nordic countries reluctant to 
fundamentally change their system of corporate governance, the Canadian experience offers an 
interesting alternative to a European framework based on the US and UK experiences.  
 
Our analysis suggested that harmonization has important downsides, in particular when rules have 
very different impact in different countries. For the same reasons binding EU directives in this area 
clearly have their drawbacks. At the same time, the ability to freely buy and sell control across 
Member States is an important aspect of the single market, and these border-transcending aspects of 
takeover regulation should be the focus of the European Commission. Much of what is in the 
current draft directive has this focus, but the strict mandatory bid rule has a broader impact and goes 
against the objectives of contestability and a level playing field. We would argue in favor of an EU 
framework for takeover regulation that balances the benefits and costs from harmonization 
recognizing the differences in corporate governance systems and the different impact of individual 
pieces of regulation. Such a framework would contain both binding directives and 
recommendations. But what should the recommendations offer, and what elements should possibly 
be binding?  
 
In some areas there are already binding rules, in particular when it comes to disclosure of ownership 
and control. But careful examination shows that in many countries this regulation is only 
implemented superficially (Barca and Becht, 2001). It is often very difficult to get access to the 
relevant information and even when this information is available the data provided is not sufficient 
to understand the control structure. Disclosure of ownership and control is critical to the market for 
corporate control and for monitoring the activities of controlling shareholders. In general, 
enforcement of existing regulation might be at least as important as introducing new regulation. 
Binding disclosure standards should be extended to a much broader range of issues, in particular 
when it comes to managerial compensation. In fact, the most urgent governance reform at the 
European level at the moment may be to increase transparency. The combination of deliberate 
concealment of relevant information and generally opaque corporate governance environments 
presents a serious obstacle to cross-border control transactions in many countries in Europe.  
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The rules that regulate the takeover process and ensure that shareholders have the right to vote on 
takeover defenses once a bid has been made are now largely accepted by most countries, even by 
Germany. Many of the other rules in the draft directive and the Winter proposals are also 
uncontroversial. Whether these rules are part of a binding proposal or not seems secondary since 
they would presumably be part of any recommendation and adopted by Member States. The 
provision in the draft directive (Article 11) that renders restrictions on voting rights and on the 
transferability of shares unenforceable against bidders should probably be part of a binding 
directive. Regulatory competition from the US suggests that management or controlling owners 
may otherwise seek jurisdictions that allow takeover defenses such as e.g., voting caps. 
 
Our analysis has been critical of the strict mandatory bid rule ruling out any control premium. 
However, even though the mandatory bid rule reduces control transfers, it does in one important 
way improve investor protection: the mandatory bid rule prevents control transfers in which the 
gains for incumbent and new controlling (minority) shareholder do not stem from value creation but 
are redistribution at the expense of small shareholders. Some form of a mandatory bid rule with a 
reasonably high threshold for triggering and an allowance for some control premium, i.e., a less 
strict rule than that advocated by the Winter Group could also be part of a recommendation, perhaps 
even of a binding part to a directive (in practice most Member States already have such a rule). For 
instance, the rule could put an upper limit on the differential between the price paid in the block 
transaction and the price offered in the subsequent mandatory bid.  
 
Generally, we argue strongly against wholesale changes of corporate governance systems. The 
strong interrelationship between the different mechanisms suggests great caution in radical reforms. 
The combined effect of the mandatory bid rule and the break-through rule, as shown in Section 6, 
would drastically have reduced the incentives to hold controlling blocks and effectively eliminated 
controlling shareholders from many companies. Alternatively, the proposal would have triggered 
new hard to foresee control structures through pyramiding and less transparent arrangements. 
 
In our view, the objective of regulation should not be to intervene in specific control structures or 
generally discourage controlling blocks. Indeed, we are against discouraging the delegation of 
control and monitoring to individual large shareholders. Rather we favor an approach that attempts 
to improve the general corporate governance environment, in particular by greatly increasing 
transparency through stricter enforcement of existing regulation and an extension of these measures 
to more areas. Controlling shareholders do in most cases perform some positive function in 
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constraining managerial behavior and they may be critical to some forms of restructuring 
(sometimes while appropriating considerable private benefits). The broader objective of regulation 
should be to make monitoring by large shareholders superfluous, not to get rid of them.  
 
In its quest to increase contestability and corporate governance the Commission should rely less 
one-sidedly on hostile takeovers and proxy fights. The level of contestability in a particular system 
stems from the combined effects of all the corporate governance mechanisms. Rather than 
undermining controlling shareholders, and effectively weakening this critically important 
mechanism of corporate governance, the Commission should try to exploit the other mechanisms. 
These mechanisms can constrain controlling shareholders and managers and thus also improve the 
functioning of the market for corporate control. It is encouraging that the second report from the 
Winter Group, after its mandate had been extended, is on corporate law reform in the EU. Many of 
the proposals in that report are about strengthening these other mechanisms, in particular the 
recommendations addressing transparency. 
 
We are convinced that improving transparency is key to activating the other mechanisms, especially 
minority shareholders and media. More information on what controlling owners and managers do, 
and how they are compensated would help curb some of the excesses and put pressure on them to 
perform. We also believe that making managers, controlling owners and board members more 
accountable through various measures such as standardized fiduciary duties can help. But we are 
less optimistic that creditors can play a larger role in corporate governance than they already do. 
Banks are neither capable of nor interested, it seems, in monitoring management on a daily basis. 
 
The bottom line is that no single mechanism is likely to deliver sufficient corporate governance and 
restructuring. Large institutional investors with a tradition of portfolio-orientation have been drawn 
into governance in the US. In the UK they have remained more passive. On the European Continent 
some of these institutions are new, but other institutional investors have been deeply involved in 
corporate governance. The evidence on their impact is still weak, but more can be done to entice 
these institutions to play a more important role. Litigation is another area where European 
experience is limited. In the US the exercise of this mechanism has largely benefited lawyers 
(Romano, 1991), but it could probably be strengthened in Europe where the risk for abuse appears 
to be less pronounced due to differences in legal practices. Perhaps some progress could also be 
made on the independence of directors on boards forcing controlling owners to accept minority 
shareholder representatives. Independence of auditors is also desirable. 
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To conclude, any regulatory exercise, in particular at the EU-level, must take into account that a 
corporate governance system is highly complex and made up of many complementary parts. An 
intervention in part of the system may have ripple effects that are not immediately obvious and hard 
to fully anticipate. The different parts of the system fit together and changes in one part may 
undermine the functioning of another, but changes in one mechanism could also reinforce another 
mechanism. Consequently, the impact of an individual takeover rule need not be uniform but 
depends on the context. As we have shown this applies, for example, to the mandatory bid. The 
strict mandatory bid rule included in the draft takeover directive goes against both objectives set up 
by the Commission: improved contestability and a “level-playing field”. The rule lowers 
contestability in firms with controlling shareholders, and since it has a differential impact depending 
on the structure of ownership and control, the rule makes the playing field less leveled.  
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